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Abstract 
In recent years, risk management associated with safety and reliability of the process 
especially in oil and gas industry has been widely used. For this purpose, different 
methods of risk analysis have been developed and successfully applied. Greater levels of 
complexity in tunnelling using TBM (Tunnel Boring Machine) especially in gassy 
tunnels with a large volume of water coming out of them, allow higher chances of failure 
that may increase the potential for tunnelling facilities to become more hazardous. When 
there is an ever increasing awareness of hazardous risks that need to be managed by the 
industrial community, the risks need to be analyzed. This paper presents the results of a 
study on risk management in a tunnel excavation with TBM. MFMEA was applied to 
analyze the risks of a tunnelling process. In order to apply MFMEA, 7 main systems and 
components involved in a tunnelling process were selected and split into subsystems. In 
total, 71 failure modes were then postulated for all subsystems. In the next step, the 
effects of every failure of each subsystem were listed. Safeguards or controls that might 
prevent or mitigate the effects of each failure were then listed. In the final step, essential 
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remedial actions to prevent or mitigate the failure were recommended. Risk Matrix was 
developed for each possible failure to be used for risk ranking. For this purpose the Risk 
Priority Number (RPN) was estimated for each failure mode to identify the most critical 
failures. The results revealed that, the failure of the ventilation system (RPN=480) is the 
most critical failure. The TBM failure due to bad rock condition (RPN=240) and rolling 
stock failure due to unleveled rails (RPN= 200) are the next significant critical failures. 
The findings from this study were applied to a long tunnel under construction and 
significantly reduced the accidents during the tunnelling period. Tracking of the accidents 
occurred during the next 2 years showed that MFMEA is a perfect method for risk 
management in tunnelling process as well. 
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Introduction 
Accidents in tunnels and 
underground spaces under construction 
may lead to major consequences. 
Tunnelling projects are very expensive; 
therefore, any failure during construction 
may lead to serious human, property and 
investment losses. For this reason, risk 
management is essential in tunnelling 
projects (Eskesene, 2004, Kouty, 2005). 
Accidents in tunnel, mine and 
underground space works may lead to 
catastrophe if they are not precisely 
predicted and effectively controlled in 
advance. In 1949 in north-east China, 
1,549 miners were killed in one accident. 
During 2004, in China 6,300 miners 
were killed in accidents. In 2003 in the 
BobNizo mine located in south east Iran, 
9 miners were killed in an explosion 
incident. In 2006 in a tunnel excavation 
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in Iran, 4 people died from deadly 
Hydrogen Disulfide (H2S) gas emission. 
In the tunnelling work of a dam project 
in the south of Iran started in 2005, 22 
workers died in 2 years in different 
accidents (Gharari, 2007). Other 
countries experience similar incidents. 
Greater levels of complexity in 
tunnelling using TBM, especially in 
gassy tunnels with a large volume of 
water coming out of them, allow higher 
chances of failure that may increase the 
potential for tunnelling facilities to 
become more hazardous. When there is 
an ever increasing awareness of 
hazardous risks that need to be managed 
by the industrial community, the risks 
need to be analyzed. This includes 
Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment 
and Risk Management (Gharari, 2007, 
Hyatt, 2003 & Brauer, 1998). 
Risk cannot be evaluated without 
first identifying the hazards involved. 
Many of the hazards will be identified 
by conducting a PHA (Process Hazard 
Analysis), such as HAZOP (Hazard and 
Operability Analysis), What If/Checklist 
or FMEA. The hazards may arise from a 
wide range of sources. They have the 
potential to harm people, property and 
the environment, but at the identification 
stage there is no clear or concise picture 
of what this danger might be or how 
often it might occur. At this stage it may 
be felt that the use of a risk matrix of 
severity versus likelihood provides an 
adequate pseudo-measure or 
approximate gauging of risk so that a 
full quantification of the risk would not 
be necessary.  
Widely used methodologies to identify 
hazards include the following (Brauer, 
1998): 
• Preliminary Hazards Analysis 
(PrHA). Also known as Screening Level 
Risk Analysis (SLRA). 
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• Hazard and Operability Analysis 
(HAZOP). 
• Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA). 
• What If Analysis 
• Checklist 
• What If + Checklist 
Among these methodologies, 
FMEA is used to analyze specific 
systems or items of equipment that are 
best handled as objects rather than by the 
use of parameters or operations (Hyatt, 
2003). FMEA is also used for analyzing 
pumps, compressors, fans and items of 
equipment having interactive mechanical 
and/or electrical components. Many 
authors, including, Hyatt (2003) believe 
that FMEA is very good for analyzing 
complex equipment items where the 
failure of a component may have a major 
consequences. Some authors believe that 
FMEA does not relate to specific failures 
that have common causes. In such cases, 
it needs to be used with Fault Tree 
Analysis to broaden the scope.  
Different standards including MIL 
STD1629A, SAE ARP 5580 and SAE 
J1739 describe the methodology for 
applying FMEA (Gharari, 2007, SAE 
J1739 & MIL-STD-1629A, 1998). 
Others, including the following, have it 
as a part of their mandate along with 
other PHAs: 
• AIAG, APQP Manual 
• FDA, GMP, QS Regulation Title 
21, CFR Part 820 
• ISO 9001 2000 
• IATF,, ISO/TS 16949 
• PSM CFR 1910, 119 
• QS 9000 
There are six types of FMEA 
namely machinery-FMEA, design-
FMEA, system-FMEA, process-FMEA, 
application-FMEA, and product-FMEA. 
The nature of the study and the stage of 
the process life cycle when it is 
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conducted, determines the type of 
FMEA to be used. Each FMEA follows 
the same approach. The nature, purpose 
and scope of the study dictate which 
type of FMEA and to what extent of 
detail is used. 
In order to modify the safety of 
operator, reliability and operability of 
machinery MFMEA (Machinery FMEA) 
is a standard technique for equipment 
failures assessment. This technique fits 
well with the objectives of present study 
to assess the risks of different machinery 
used in the tunnelling process.  
In Iran, many researchers, including, 
Pourparand (1993), Kakavandi (1995), 
Ali Mohammadi (1997), Azar Barzine 
(2000), and Naderi (2005) applied 
FMEA to assess safety status of different 
manufacturing processes. In all of these 
studies Risk Matrix was used for risk 
ranking. For this purpose RPN was 
estimated to identify the most critical 
failures. None of these studies applied to 
tunnelling Gharari, 2007. All of these 
works have been published in Farsi.  
In other countries different studies, 
including Abdul-Nour et al (1998), 
Pinna et al (1998), Sankar and Prabhu 
(2001), Scipioni et al (2002), Price and 
Taylor (2002), Seung and Ishii (2003), 
Seyyed-Hosseini (2005), Dominguez et 
al (2006), Burgazzi et al (2006), and Eti 
et al (2006) used FMEA to analyze the 
safety of different processes. None of 
these processes included tunnelling. In 
most of these studies RPN was 
calculated and then the safety status was 
assessed. In 2004 Working Group 2 of 
the International Tunnel Association 
issued guidelines for tunnelling risk 
assessment (Eskesene, 2004). These 
guidelines are considered for the risks 
integrated with other systems and are 
useful for both consultants and 
contractors. 
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The Tehran–North freeway is one of 
the largest road projects in Iran. Many 
tunnels, including the longest national 
road tunnel are under construction in this 
project. This tunnel, called Alborz, is 
located at 2,400 m higher than sea level 
and is 6,350 m in length with maximum 
850 m of over burden. The tunnel 
consists of 3 bores, two main tunnels 
with a pilot tunnel between them. The 
pilot tunnel is under excavation using 
TBM to gather geotechnical data for the 
main tunnel design. The pilot tunnel will 
be used as a service tunnel during the 
tunnel operation.  
Pro-excavation geological data 
showed that gas emission and water flow 
was expected in the tunnel. Methane 
(CH4) and Hydrogen Disulfide (H2S) 
emissions in very high concentrations 
were recorded before applying this risk 
analysis. TBM stop due to bad rock 
condition was also expected. The TBM 
used in this project was not originally 
designed for gassy tunnels. It was also 
not designed to work in a tunnel with a 
large volume of water coming out of it. 
Therefore, MFMEA was applied to 
assess the tunnelling risks in the Alborz 
Tunnel. 
 
Material and Methods 
In the present study, Machinery 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(MFMEA) was applied to identify 
failures, evaluate the effects of the 
failures and prioritize the failures 
according to the severity of effects 
during the excavation of a long tunnel 
with TBM. For prioritization or risk 
ranking, Risk Matrix (Risk Priority 
Number) was used.  
For application of MFMEA, 
pertinent information e.g. site plans, 
charts, operations information, 
procedures, relevant data, and design 
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plan were collected. In the next step the 
purpose, scope, depth of the study, 
associated costs, expertise, experience 
available and so on were established. 
The system was broken into logical and 
manageable items by function or area 
location. In total 7 main components 
were studied. All of this information was 
recorded in FMEA Tabular format. All 
potential failure modes for each item 
were identified. The causes of each 
failure mode were determined. All 
current controls were identified and 
listed. A rating for severity, occurrence 
and detection of each failure was 
assigned. All correction actions were 
determined. In the final step, the 
recommendations were carried out.  
Risk Matrix was used for 
prioritizing risks. Risk Matrix is 
developed using severity, likelihood and 
detection parameters. These need to be 
estimated in order to estimate Risk 
Priority Number (RPN). In the present 
study, the severity parameter was ranked 
according to QS9000 and SAE.J1739 
recommendations. Table 1, shows 
severity ranking used in this study.  
Table 1 
The MTBF (Mean Time Between 
Failures) is used for likelihood ranking 
(Hyatt, 2003 & SAE J1739). In the 
present study this information was 
estimated from available site data 
including previous incidents, 
maintenance periods, operator’s 
experiences and etc. According to 
QS9000 recommendations MTBF was 
used for likelihood ranking. Table 2 
shows likelihood ranking used in the 
present study.  
Table 2 
Detection is ranked using a number 
which is estimated from failure detection 
and control levels available on each 
system or subsystem. In the present 
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study the detection ranking was used 
according to QS 9000 and SAE J1739 
recommendations. Table 3 shows the 
detection ranking used in the present 
study. Risks are categorized using Risk 
Priority Number (RPN). RPN is 
calculated using the following equation. 
( )1NumberDetectionNumberLikelihoodNumberSeverityRPN ××=  
Risk Matrix is developed using 
likelihood and severity parameters. The 
Risk Ranking is categorized according to 
the RPN calculated for each failure.  
Table 3 
Different measures are considered 
to decide whether it is necessary to 
intervene for modification or prevention 
of failures. Review of failure 
characteristics including critical 
condition, controlling possibilities, 
safety or severity and an acceptable RPN 
could be considered as a measure of 
decision making for modification or 
prevention of failures. 
Acceptable RPN varies from a plant 
to plant. Naderi (2005) considered it to 
be 100 for analysis of a lift. The number 
was obtained from multiplying 4×5×5. 
Ulrich Hussels used the RPN of 108 as 
an acceptable level in a vehicle cooling 
system analysis. This number was 
obtained from 3×4×9 (Gharari, 2007). It 
is believed that when the range of 
severity, likelihood and detection is from 
1 to 10 a risk with its RPN ≥100 is a 
high risk failure and if the severity is 
more than 5, then modifying the design 
work is essential (Gharari, 2007). 
Acceptable RPN is usually considered 
according to engineering decisions, 
regulatory restrictions, safety standards, 
financial status of the organization and 
etc. Considering these measures, an 
acceptable RPN of 80 was determined in 
the present study. The acceptable RPN 
was based on multiplying 5×4×4 = 80. 
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Failure modes with higher RPN were 
categorized critical failures then.    
 
Results and Discussion 
In total 7 main systems were 
studied. Table 4 shows the systems that 
were studied in this analysis. A total 
number of 71 potential failure modes 
were identified and studied for all 7 
main components. For each system and 
subsystem a Tabular form similar to 
Table (A) in the appendix was 
completed. As it is shown in this Table, 
the modification and control actions 
which could be applied to reduce the 
RPN of each failure were also 
recommended by the related expertise 
team with its effect on final RPN. The 
severity, likelihood and detection rating 
for each failure at existing condition and 
after recommended control actions taken 
were estimated. Risk Priority Number of 
each failure mode was then calculated. 
Table 5 shows MFMEA results of 
electric system and subsystems. 
According to this Table, low output 
voltage from transformers had a Risk 
Priority Number of greater than 
acceptable level which needed to be 
modified. Power generator, short circuit 
in secondary windings of the 
transformer, high voltage drop along the 
power distribution line or getting high 
current from the system may lead to a 
low output voltage.  
Table 5 
This failure can effect electric 
consuming subsystems or burn the 
transformer and finally stop the TBM. It 
can be prevented or discovered through 
applying voltage control relays, breakers 
sensitive to voltage in main circuit 
breakers, and phase controlling relays. 
The related expertise team suggested 
applying Programmable Logic Circuit 
(PLC) for design modification and 
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controlling this failure mode. They 
believe that the application of PLC will 
reduce the RPN from 90 to an acceptable 
level of 60.  
Table 6 shows the MFMEA results 
of TBM Hydraulic System. According to 
these results, in TBM Hydraulic system, 
all failure modes except the starting 
defect of pressure supplier (RPN=96) 
were low risk failure modes. The high 
likelihood number of this failure means 
that the probability of its occurrence is 
relatively high. This failure mode that 
can stop the TBM may be caused mainly 
due to defective electromotor, defective 
circulation pump problems in main 
circuit or lose fittings. The related 
expertise team recommended an 
appropriate preventive maintenance 
program in order to control this failure. 
The application of an appropriate 
preventive maintenance is expected to 
reduce the likelihood number from 8 to 5 
and the RPN from 96 to 40.  
Table 6 
Table 7 shows the MFMEA results 
of TBM Pneumatic system. The results 
show that, considering Risk Priority 
Numbers, defective opening of high 
pressure tank is the only high risk failure 
mode in the pneumatic system. 
Corrosion, humidity and any obstacle in 
the tap may lead to this failure. The 
failure will increase the pressure of the 
tank and burst it which will finally stop 
the TBM. At present, the pressure 
gauges on air tanks and in TBM control 
rooms are used to detect this failure.  
Table 7 
The MFMEA expertise team 
recommended preventive maintenance, 
periodical checks, and punctual 
replacement of the appropriate parts to 
control this failure. The application of 
these recommendations is expected to 
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reduce the RPN of this failure mode 
from 108 to 54. The control actions will 
not reduce the severity number. A 
modification design for the opening 
mechanism of the high pressure tank is 
required to reduce severity number. 
The results also show that in the 
TBM pneumatic system 3 failure modes 
had severity numbers higher than 5. 
They included electric coil breakdown, 
starting defect of air supplier and 
opening defect of pressure tank. If the 
electric coil of air supplier breaks down, 
it will not have any local effects but it 
will stop the compressor which will 
consequently stop the TBM. At present, 
PLC is applied to detect this failure. The 
expertise team believed that an 
appropriate preventive maintenance 
program will reduce its likelihood and 
detection numbers leading to a reduction 
of RPN from 56 to 14. The control 
actions will not reduce the severity 
number, thus modification of electric 
coil design seems to be essential.  
Starting defect in air supplier will 
not have a local effect, but it will stop 
the compressor which will consequently 
stop the TBM. Any defects in PLC, 
burning of contactor blades, sulfating, 
dust and any electrical or mechanical 
defectives in electromotor may lead to 
this failure mode. Presently, PLC is used 
to detect this failure. Preventive 
maintenance is suggested to reduce RPN 
from 54 to 24, but it will not reduce the 
severity number. A modification of 
starting design is recommended to 
reduce severity number. 
Table 8 shows the MFMEA results 
of TBM Mechanic system. Cutter head 
stop is the most severe and highly risk 
failure mode in this system. High 
severity and likelihood numbers are the 
special characteristics of this failure 
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mode. This failure leads to stop the 
TBM. 
Table 8 
 Bad rock condition is the main 
reason the cutter head stops. Core 
drilling is recommended to identify rock 
condition in advance. This will reduce 
the likelihood number from 8 to 6 and 
reduce the detection number from 3 to 2 
which all together will reduce the RPN 
from 240 to 120. This suggestion was 
applied and reduced the cutter head stop 
due to rock condition from then on.  
Cutter disc wear is the next failure 
mode with a high RPN and severity 
number. It may lead to TBM stop. Bad 
Rock condition and non-standard disc 
material are the main reasons for this 
failure. The expertise team 
recommended using standard discs and 
periodical checks to prevent this failure. 
These actions will reduce the likelihood 
number from 4 to 2 and the detection 
number from 7 to 5 which will totally 
reduce the RPN from 168 to 60. 
The third failure mode with a RPN 
higher than 80 is scraper defect (break 
down and wear). This failure mode will 
stop the TBM. This failure has a 
relatively high detection number. Thus 
periodical checks may help to detect it 
easier. The team did not make any 
recommendations.     
Table 9 shows the MFMEA results 
of the ventilation system. According to 
this Table the most critical failure mode 
(e.g. high air pressure in duct) is related 
to this system. This failure is mainly due 
to duct blockage which will burst the 
duct. At present, there is almost no 
controlling mechanism. Using dampers 
at the jet fan inlet, applying electro-
motors with controllable rotation, as well 
as using standard duct material and 
proper duct mounting are recommended 
by the expertise team to prevent this 
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failure. These actions will reduce 
likelihood number from 8 to 4 and 
detection number from 6 to 4 which will 
totally reduce the risk number from 480 
to 160. This RPN will still be high. 
Table 9 
Low air pressure in the ducts is the 
next failure with a high Risk Priority 
Number. This failure may be caused by 
low fan rotation, wrong ventilation 
design, duct leakage etc. It will lead to 
insufficient fresh air in the tunnel that 
can threat the human life in tunnel. 
Preventive maintenance, periodical 
checks, and the use of anemometers to 
measure air velocity at the duct exit are 
recommended by the expertise team. The 
application of these recommendations 
will reduce RPN of this failure from 240 
to 60.  
Most of the failure modes studied in 
the ventilation system had the highest 
severity number. 4 failure modes out of 
6 failure modes in this system had the 
highest severity number. This shows the 
significant role of ventilation system in 
gassy and long tunnels such as the 
Alborz Tunnel. In a similar tunnel with 
H2S the same failure led to death of 4 
people in the east of Iran in 2005. Losing 
ventilation system for 3 minutes in the 
Alborz Tunnel caused a fire incidence 
due to methane gas in tunnel. 
Table 10 shows the MFMEA results 
of Shot Crete system. According to this 
Table only one failure mode e.g. plastic 
plate wear has a RPN of higher than 80. 
It can stop the Shot Crete system and 
finally stop the TBM. Plastic plate wear 
is normal during their operation. 
Preventive maintenance can reduce its 
RPN from 84 to 20. 
Table 10 
Table 11 shows the MFMES results 
of Rolling Stock. All failure modes 
studied in the Rolling Stock System are 
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high risks (e.g. RPN higher than 80) 
with the highest severity numbers.  
Table 11 
High rail width has a RPN of 160. 
This failure is caused by moving the 
vehicle on it, defective traverses, poor 
material, construction and maintenance. 
This failure can lead to higher wearing 
of the rail, derailing of vehicles which 
will affect personnel safety, closing of 
the rail and finally stopping the TBM. At 
present monthly periodical checks and 
measurement of the width of the rail are 
the methods used to detect and prevent 
the failure. The expertise team 
recommended appropriate preventive 
maintenance, weekly measurement of 
rail width, supporting of traverses 
according to their bearing load, selection 
of the optimum cross section for wheel 
profile and mounting derailing 
mechanism to prevent traverse 
movement. These preventive actions will 
reduce the RPN from 160 to 40. The 
severity of the failure will not be 
reduced by the application of preventive 
actions. The likelihood and detection 
numbers will be reduced from 4 to 2.  
Low rail width is the next high risk 
failure mode with a RPN of 120. This 
failure is caused by increasing road 
gradient, passing heavy duty vehicles 
such as loaders over the rail and ballast 
deficiency between traverses. The local 
effect of low rail width causes the wheel 
bandage to wear and finally derails the 
vehicle. This failure affects the 
personnel safety and may lead to road 
closure and stopping the TBM. Monthly 
checks and rail width measurements are 
used to detect the failure at present. 
Appropriate preventive maintenance, 
weekly rail width measurements, 
supporting the rail foundation between 
traverses, and mounting derailing 
mechanism to prevent traverse 
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movement are the expertise 
recommendations. The application of 
these preventive actions is expected to 
reduce the RPN of this failure from 120 
to 40. They will reduce likelihood 
number from 3 to 2 and the detection 
number from 4 to 2. These actions will 
not reduce severity number from 10. 
Lateral unleveled traverse with a 
RPN of 200 is the next high risk failure. 
Improper construction and maintenance, 
uneven foundation, inflation due to iced 
water, bent rails, old traverses and 
unstable ground are the main causes of 
this failure. This failure causes 
discomfort for commuters in vehicles 
and may lead to derailment of vehicles. 
It also affects personnel safety, road 
closure and stopping the TBM. The 
MFMEA team recommended an 
appropriate preventive maintenance 
program, weekly periodical checks, 
supporting the rail foundation with 
suitable soil, the mounting of a derailing 
mechanism to prevent traverse 
movement and using standard traverses. 
The application of these 
recommendations is expected to reduce 
the failures’ RPN from 200 to 60. They 
will reduce the likelihood number of this 
failure from 5 to 3 and detection number 
from 4 to 2. The recommendations will 
not reduce the severity number. 
Rail defect with a RPN of 200 is 
also a high risk failure. This failure is 
caused by improper construction and 
maintenance, uneven foundation, 
inflation due to iced water, bent rails, 
defected traverses and dirty ballast. Rail 
defect can move one rail with respect to 
the other rail, move a rail in any 
direction and derail the vehicle. The 
consequences of this failure can affect 
personnel safety, close the rail road and 
stop the TBM. Monthly periodical 
checks and rail measurements are the 
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means of detecting the failure at present. 
The expertise team recommended 
correcting improper rail rotations in road 
bends, weekly periodical checks, 
adjusting rotation with proper 
equipment, the mounting of derailing 
mechanism to prevent traverse 
movement, using standard traverses and 
to tampon when the season changes. The 
application of recommendations is 
expected to reduce the failures’ RPN 
from 200 to 60. The RPN will be 
reduced mainly due to likelihood and 
detection number reduction (table 11).    
Lateral deflection of lever with a 
RPN of 160 is the next high risk failure. 
This failure is caused by thermal 
variation of rails, improper bolts and 
connections or low resistance ballast. 
This failure may derail the vehicle which 
consequently will affect personnel 
safety, close the rail road and stop the 
TBM. At present, monthly periodical 
checks and rail measurements are the 
means of detecting this failure. Expertise 
MFMEA team recommended an 
appropriate levering program, weekly 
periodical checks and lever adjustments 
according to guidelines. The application 
of these recommendations is expected to 
reduce the RPN of this failure from 160 
to 40 (table 11). 
Longitudinal Rail Cracks with a 
RPN of 120 also constitute a high risk 
failure. Normal operation, passing heavy 
duty vehicles over the rail, old rails and 
corrosion are the main causes of this 
failure which can break the rail or its 
crown and derail the vehicle. 
Consequently this may affect the 
personnel safety, close the rail road and 
stop the TBM. Visual checks are the 
only means to detect this failure at 
present. The MFMEA team 
recommended using ultrasonic 
instrumentation to check the rail cracks. 
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The application of this instrumentation is 
expected to reduce the RPN of this 
failure from 120 to 20 (table 11).  
No blade contact with a RPN of 120 
is another high risk failure. An 
unbalanced needle (laterally and 
longitudinally unbalanced rail guide), 
existence of metallic chips around the 
needle or a bent needle can cause this 
failure. This failure may derail the 
vehicle which will affect personnel 
safety, close the rail road and stop the 
TBM. Monthly periodical checks are the 
only means of investigating this failure. 
The expertise team recommended a daily 
preventive maintenance program to 
reduce the likelihood and detection 
numbers of this failure (table 11). The 
application of a daily preventive 
maintenance program will reduce the 
Risk Priority Number from 120 to 40.  
Wheel wear with a RPN of 180 is 
the last high risk failure in railway 
system. Mismatching between wheel and 
rail hardness, nonstandard profile, wrong 
rail geometry and reduction in bend 
radius can lead to wheel wear. This 
failure can derail the vehicle and affect 
personnel safety, close the rail road and 
stop the TBM. Daily checks are the only 
means of detecting wheel wears. 
MFMEA team recommended 
appropriated preventive maintenance, 
selecting the optimum cross section and 
standard material for wheels, oiling the 
rails at bends, not applying extra width 
at bends and using automatic greasing 
instruments for better detection and 
likelihood parameter. The application of 
these recommendations is expected to 
reduce the RPN from 180 to 90.    
A Risk Priority Number of 80 was 
considered as an acceptable level. 
According to this level, 18 failure modes 
with higher RPN were categorized 
unacceptable failures. Table 12 shows 
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these failure modes with their codes. The 
results show that even after modification 
and applying control measures, 3 failure 
modes will still have a RPN of higher 
than 80. These failure modes are high air 
pressure in ventilation duct, cutter head 
stop and locomotive wheel wear.  
Table 12 
The Risk Priority Number of these 
failure modes before and after control 
application is tabulated in Table 13. 
Table 13 
In total 21 failure modes had 
severity numbers higher than 5. The 
systems in which these failures are 
expected need to be redesigned. These 
failure modes are listed in Table 14.  
Table 14 
The accidents occurred in next two 
years were tracked. The results revealed 
that, modification of the process and 
equipment reduced the accidents 
significantly. One small fire incident due 
to ventilation failure (for 1 minuet), 3 
TBM stops due to bad rock condition 
and 3 derailing due to unleveled rails 
were the most major accidents occurred 
during next two years. The consequences 
of these accidents were negligible. The 
comparison of the accidents (numbers 
and consequences) with similar projects 
shows that this project was successful in 
accident prevention. 
Table A, Appendix 
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 Table 1: Severity Ranking used in the present study (QS9000 & SAE.J1739) 
Rank Effect Measure: Severity Effect 
10 Maximum 
Severity 
Injury or harm to operating personnel. Failure resulting in 
hazardous effects almost certain. Non-compliance with 
government regulations. 
9 Extreme 
Severity 
Failure resulting in hazardous effects highly probable. Safety and 
regulatory concerns. 
8 Very High 
Severity 
Significant downtime and major financial impacts. Product 
inoperable but safe. User very dissatisfied, e.g. TBM stops for 
longer than 30 days 
7 High 
Severity 
Significant downtime. Product performance severely affected. 
User very dissatisfied, e.g. TBM stops for 10 -30 days 
6 Severe Disruption to downstream process. Product operable and safe but 
performance degraded. User dissatisfied, e.g. TBM stops for 24 hr 
-10 days. 
5 Moderate Impacts will be noticeable throughout operations. Reduced 
performance with gradual performance degradation. User 
dissatisfied, e.g. TBM stops for 10 to 24 hr 
4 Minor Local and/or downstream process might be affected. User will 
experience minor negative impact on the product. e.g. TBM stops 
for 1 to 10 hr. 
3 Slight User will probably notice the effect but the effect is slight e.g. 
TBM stops for less than 1 hr. 
 21
2 Very Slight No downstream effect. Insignificant / negligible effect. e.g. 
parameter variation is in control range, adjustments or controls are 
essential. 
1 None Might be noticeable by the operator. Improbable/not noticeable by 
the user e.g. parameter variation is in control range, adjustments 
or controls are not essential or it can be checked during 
maintenance shift. 
 
 
Table 2: Likelihood ranking used in the present study (QS9000) 
Rank Failure Occurrence Failure Rate 
10 Very High, failure almost certain. MTBF≤1 hr 
9 Very high number of failures likely. 2 hr<MTBF≤10 hr 
8 High number of failures likely.  11 hr<MTBF≤100 hr 
7 Moderately high number of failures likely. 101 hr<MTBF≤400 hr 
6 Medium number of failures likely. 401 hr<MTBF≤1000 hr 
5 Occasional failures likely. 1001 hr<MTBF≤2000 hr 
4 Few failures likely. 2001 hr<MTBF≤3000 hr 
3 Very few failures likely. 3001 hr<MTBF≤6000 hr 
2 Rare number of failures likely. 6001 hr<MTBF≤10000 hr
1 Failure highly unlikely. MTBF>10000 hr 
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Table 3: Detection Ranking used in the present study (QS9000 & SAE.J1739) 
Rank Effect Measure: Severity Effect 
10 Extremely Unlikely Controls will almost certainly not detect the existence of a 
defect, or there are no controls on the equipment. 
9 Remote Likelihood Controls have a very low probability of detecting existence 
of a defect. 
8 Very Low 
Likelihood 
Has lowest effectiveness in each applicable category. 
7 Low Likelihood Has low effectiveness for detection. 
6 Moderately Low 
Likelihood 
Has moderately low effectiveness for detection. 
5 Medium 
Likelihood 
Has medium effectiveness for detection 
4 Moderately High 
Likelihood 
Has moderately high effectiveness for detection. 
3 High Likelihood Has high effectiveness for detection. 
2 Very High 
Likelihood 
Controls have very high probability of detecting existence 
of failure.  
1 Extremely Likely Controls will almost certainly detect the existence of the 
defect. 
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Table 4: Studied systems and subsystems 
System System 
Code 
Subsystem Subsystem 
Code 
Component Component 
Code 
 
TBM Electric 
System 
 
 
1 
Generator 
Transformer 
Control 
Board 
Power Board 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
  
 
TBM 
Hydraulic 
System 
 
 
2 
Reservoir 
Piping 
Pump 
Feeding 
Pump 
Oil Cooler 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
  
 
TBM 
Pneumatic 
System 
 
 
3 
Compressor 
 
Electromotor 
Air Tank 
Air Screw 
Pump 
3.1 
 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
Filter 
Outlet 
Valve 
 
Relief 
Valve 
3.1.1 
3.1.2 
 
3.3.2 
TBM 
Mechanical 
System 
 
4 
Grab 
Cutter Head 
Conveyor 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
  
 24
Tunnel 
Ventilation 
System 
 
5 
Electromotor 
Ball Bearing 
Duct 
5.1 
5.2 
5.3 
  
 
Shot Crete 
System 
 
 
6 
Mixer 
Conveyor 
Pump 
Hose 
Nozzle 
6.1 
6.2 
6.3 
6.4 
6.5 
  
Rolling Stock 7 Rail Road 
Vehicles 
7.1 
7.2 
Turn Out 
Wheels 
7.1.1 
7.2.1 
 
Table 5: MFMEA results of Electric System. 
Existing Condition After Control Code Failure Mode 
SV LN DN RPN SV LN DN RPN
1.1 High Voltage 8 2 3 48 5 1 2 10 
1.1 Low Voltage 2 6 4 48 2 5 3 30 
1.1 High Current 3 4 2 24 3 3 2 18 
1.1 Low Current 2 4 2 16 - - - - 
1.2 HV Leakage 7 3 3 63 7 2 2 28 
1.2 LV Disconnection 5 4 3 60 5 2 2 20 
1.2 No Voltage 3 1 3 9 3 1 2 6 
1.2 Low Output Voltage 5 6 3 90 5 6 2 60 
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1.2 High Output Voltage 5 2 3 30 5 2 1 10 
1.2 Missing Dynamo Layers 8 1 3 24 8 1 2 16 
1.2 Dirty Contactors 3 3 4 36 3 2 2 12 
1.2 Leakage 3 2 4 24 3 1 2 6 
1.3 Wire Corrosion 4 2 4 32 4 1 2 8 
1.4 Phase to Phase Connection 4 1 3 12 4 1 2 8 
1.4 Broken Internal Parts 4 3 2 24 4 2 1 8 
1.4 Phase to Earth Connection 4 3 3 36 4 2 1 8 
 
Table 6: MFMEA results of TBM Hydraulic System. 
Existing Condition After Control Code Failure Mode 
SV LN DN RPN SV LN DN RPN
2.1 Bubble forming 2 2 8 32 - - - - 
2.1.1 Dirty Oil 2 2 4 16 - - - - 
2.2 Leakage 4 1 3 12 4 1 2 8 
2.3 External Leakage 4 3 3 36 4 2 2 16 
2.3 Starting Defect 4 8 3 96 4 5 2 40 
2.3 Turning Off Defect 4 2 3 24 4 1 2 8 
2.3 Uncontrollable 4 2 5 40 - - - - 
2.4 Starting Defect 4 2 3 24 4 1 2 8 
2.4 Turning Off Defect 4 2 3 24 4 1 2 8 
2.4 Coupling Breakdown 4 2 5 40 - - - - 
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Table 7: MFMEA results of TBM Pneumatic System. 
Existing Condition After Control Code Failure Mode 
SV LN DN RPN SV LN DN RPN
3.1 Ball Bearing Defect - - - - - - - - 
3.1 Electric Coil Breakdown 7 2 4 56 7 1 2 14 
3.1 Starting Defect 6 3 3 54 6 2 3 24 
3.1.1 Dirty Filter 3 4 3 36 3 2 2 12 
3.1.2 External Air Leakage 4 3 4 48 4 2 2 16 
3.2 Ball Bearing Defect - - - - - - - - 
3.2 Shorting Coil 4 2 2 16 4 1 2 8 
3.2 Two Phase Electricity 4 3 2 24 4 1 1 4 
3.3 Air Leakage 3 3 3 27 3 1 1 3 
3.3.1 Air Leakage 3 3 4 36 - - - - 
3.3.1 Opening Defect 9 3 4 108 9 2 3 54 
3.3.1 Closing Defect 4 3 4 48 4 2 2 16 
3.4 Ball Bearing Wear - - - - - - - - 
3.4 Starting Defect 5 3 3 30 5 2 2 20 
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Table 8: MFMEA results of TBM Mechanic System. 
Existing Condition After Control Code Failure Mode 
SV LN DN RPN SV LN DN RPN
4.1 Packing Run away 5 4 3 60 5 3 3 30 
4.1 Inlet Tap Breakdown 4 4 3 48 4 3 2 24 
4.1 Electric Tap Breakdown 6 4 2 48 6 2 2 24 
4.2 Cutter Head Stop 10 8 3 240 10 6 2 120 
4.2 Cutter Disc Wear 6 4 7 168 6 2 5 60 
4.2 Scraper Defect 5 3 6 90 - - - - 
4.3 Ball Bearing Breakdown 5 4 4 80 5 2 4 40 
4.3 Belt Tear 4 6 3 72 - - - - 
 
Table 9: MFMEA results of Ventilation System. 
Existing Condition After Control Code Failure Mode 
SV LN DN RPN SV LN DN RPN
5.1 Starting Failure 10 3 1 30 10 2 1 20 
5.1 Over Load 4 4 3 48 4 3 2 24 
5.1 Low Voltage 10 3 2 60 10 2 1 20 
5.2 Ball Bearing Breakdown 4 2 5 40 4 1 3 12 
5.3 Low Air Pressure 10 6 4 240 10 2 3 60 
5.3 High Air Pressure 10 8 6 480 10 4 4 160 
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Table 10: MFMEA results of Shot Crete System. 
Existing Condition After Control Code Failure Mode 
SV LN DN RPN SV LN DN RPN
6.1 Mixer Blade Binding 4 6 3 72 4 4 3 32 
6.2 Belt Tear 5 2 3 30 5 1 2 10 
6.3 Plastic Plates Wear 4 7 3 84 2 5 2 20 
6.3 Cylinder Plate Break down 4 2 4 32 4 1 3 12 
6.4 External Leakage 4 8 2 64 4 4 2 32 
6.4 Hose Tear 4 5 1 20 4 3 1 12 
6.4 Coupling Leakage 4 5 2 40 4 3 1 12 
6.5 Water Tap Breakdown 3 7 1 21 - - - - 
 
Table 11: MFMEA results of Rolling Stock System. 
Existing Condition After Control Code Failure Mode 
SV LN DN RPN SV LN DN RPN
7.1 High Rail Width 10 4 4 160 10 2 2 40 
7.1 Low Rail Width 10 3 4 120 10 2 2 40 
7.1 Lateral Unleveled Traverse 10 5 4 200 10 3 2 60 
7.1 Rail Defect 10 5 4 200 10 3 2 60 
7.1 Lever Deflection 10 4 4 160 10 2 2 40 
7.1 Longitudinal Rail Cracks 10 2 6 120 10 1 2 20 
7.1.1 No Blade Contact 10 3 4 120 10 2 2 40 
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7.2.1 Wheel Wear 10 6 3 180 10 3 3 90 
 
Table 12: Unacceptable Failure Modes (e.g. RPN>80). 
Code Failure Mode Existing Condition After Control 
1.2 Low Output Voltage 90 60 
2.3 Starting Defect 96 40 
3.3.1 Opening Defect 108 54 
4.2 Cutter Head Stop 240 120 
4.2 Worn Cutter Disc 168 60 
4.2 Scraper Defect 90 0 
4.3 Ball Bearing Breakdown 80 40 
5.3 Low Air Pressure 240 60 
5.3 High Air Pressure 480 160 
6.3 Plastic Plates Wear 84 20 
7.1 High Rail Width 160 40 
7.1 Low Rail Width 120 40 
7.1 Lateral Unleveled Traverse 200 60 
7.1 Rail Defect 200 60 
7.1 Lever Defection 160 40 
7.1 Rail Cracks 120 20 
7.1.1 No Blade Contact 120 40 
7.2.1 Wheel Wear 180 90 
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Table 13: Risk Priority Numbers of Critical Failure Modes 
Existing Condition After Control Code Failure Mode 
SV LN DN RPN SV LN DN RPN 
4.2 Cutter Head Stop 10 8 3 240 10 6 2 120 
5.3 High Air Pressure 10 8 6 480 10 4 4 160 
7.2.1 Wheel Wear 10 6 3 180 10 3 3 90 
 
Table 14: Failure Modes that require modification due to high Severity parameter 
Existing Condition After Control Code Failure Mode 
SV LN DN RPN SV LN DN RPN
1.1 High Voltage 8 2 3 48 5 1 2 10 
1.2 HV Leakage 7 3 3 63 7 2 2 28 
1.2 Missing Dynamo Layers 8 1 3 24 8 1 2 16 
3.1 Electric Coil Breakdown 7 2 4 56 7 1 2 14 
3.1 Starting Defect 6 3 3 54 6 2 3 24 
3.3.1 Opening Defect 9 3 4 108 9 2 3 54 
4.1 Electric Tap Breakdown 6 4 2 48 6 2 2 24 
4.2 Cutter Head Stop 10 8 3 240 10 6 2 120 
4.2 Cutter Disc Wear 6 4 7 168 6 2 5 60 
5.1 Starting Failure 10 3 1 30 10 2 1 20 
5.1 Low Voltage 10 3 2 60 10 2 1 20 
5.3 Low Air Pressure 10 6 4 240 10 2 3 60 
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5.3 High Air Pressure 10 8 6 480 10 4 4 160 
7.1 High Rail Width 10 4 4 160 10 2 2 40 
7.1 Low Rail Width 10 3 4 120 10 2 2 40 
7.1 Lateral Unleveled Traverse 10 5 4 200 10 3 2 60 
7.1 Rail Defect 10 5 4 200 10 3 2 60 
7.1 Lever Defection 10 4 4 160 10 2 2 40 
7.1 Rail Cracks 10 2 6 120 10 1 2 20 
7.1.1 No Blade Contact 10 3 4 120 10 2 2 40 
7.2.1 Wheel Wear 10 6 3 180 10 3 3 90 
 
Appendix 
Table A: Machinery Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Form 
Prepared by: ---------    System: ------------  
No of MFMEA: ------    Subsystem: -------------- 
Page ---- of -----Pages    Department: -------------- 
Date: -------     FMEA Team: ------------- 
Failure Effects Results of  Actions Code Perf Failure 
Local 
Effects 
Other 
Parts 
SEP 
SN Failure 
Reason 
LN Existing 
DPC 
DN RPN RAT 
SN LN DN RPN 
          
          
SEP: Subsystem, Environment and Personnel 
DPC: Detecting, Preventing and Controls 
RAT: Recommended Actions Take 
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